Implementing stakeholder participation as “egalitarian bidding”:the test of the Kantian pudding is in the institutionalized eating by Alberti, Federica et al.
Working Papers in Economics & Finance
2020-09
Implementing stakeholder participa-
tion as “egalitarian bidding” 
– The test of the Kantian pudding is in 
the institutionalized eating 
Federica Alber,, University of Portsmouth 
Werner Güth, LUISS Guido Carli and Max Planck 
Ins,tute for Research on Collec,ve Goods  
Hartmut Kliemt, Justus-Liebig-Universitaet 
Giessen  
Kei Tsutsui, University of Bath  
Portsmouth Business School  
hLps://www.port.ac.uk/about-us/structure-and-governance/organisa,onal-structure/our-academ-
ic-structure/faculty-of-business-and-law/portsmouth-business-school
Faculty of 
Business 
and Law
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
Implementing stakeholder participation as “egalitarian bidding” –  
The test of the Kantian pudding is in the institutionalized eating 
 
 
Federica Albertia  Werner Güthbc  Hartmut Kliemtd  Kei Tsutsuie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a University of Portsmouth, Richmond Building, Portland Street, Portsmouth PO1 3DE, United Kingdom. Tel.: 
+44 2392 844072. Email: federica.alberti@port.ac.uk 
b LUISS Guido Carli, Viale Romania 32, 00197 Roma, Italy. Tel.: +39 6 85225.550. 
c Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany. 
Tel.: +49 228 91416 176. Email: gueth@coll.mpg.de. 
d Justus-Liebig-Universitaet Giessen, Licher Str. 66, 35394 Giessen, Germany. Tel.: +49 641 99 2220 1. Email: 
Hartmut.Kliemt@wirtschaft.uni-giessen.de. 
e University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7JP, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 1225 386402. Email: 
k.tsutsui@bath.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract: Stakeholder conceptions of corporate governance tend to address managers and 
owners of companies as benevolent despots who follow ethical appeals to respect all 
stakeholders equally. Avoiding the benevolent despot assumption we axiomatically specify 
how “stakeholder participation as ‘egalitarian bidding’ ” could conceivably be used to 
implement the values underlying stakeholder conceptions as procedures of corporate 
governance. We do not claim that stakeholder theorists have to concur with our proposed 
operationalization of their ideals. Yet those who do not accept participatory ‘egalitarian 
bidding’ should come up with some alternative operationalization of “equal (Kantian) 
respect” or admit that their theories are non-operational.  
 
Keywords: Stakeholder conceptions of management, interpersonal equal respect, corporate 
governance, intrinsic motivation, procedural fairness  
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1. Introduction and Overview 
The conflict between so-called shareholder and stakeholder approaches forms one if not the 
defining controversy of business ethics. In this controversy classical liberal economists and 
ethicists tend to take sides with Milton Friedman’s thesis that owners and managers should 
follow market signals in pursuit of shareholder value (the so-called shareholder value 
approach). Advocates of ‘socially responsible management’ lean towards Edward Freeman’s 
view that stakeholders of a company have to be taken into account not only instrumentally in 
pursuit of shareholder value and according to prices but ethically deserve to be treated with 
(Kantian) equal respect as “ends in themselves” (the so-called stakeholder value approach).  
 To the best of our knowledge, stakeholder conceptions have not yet managed to show 
how their appeals can be translated into rules that can be implemented as corporate 
governance procedures. We subsequently exemplify in procedural terms how participatory 
corporate governance rules can conceivably guarantee that stakeholders of a company are not 
treated as “mere means” to others’ ends in corporate decision-making. We regard this as a 
preliminary step towards an institutionally and practically grounded discussion of the relative 
merits of stakeholder value theories of corporate governance vis a vis shareholder value 
approaches.  
In the next section we illustrate that both Freeman and Friedman subscribe to Kantian 
ideals of interpersonal respect albeit on different levels of governance. With this in hand, we 
introduce our procedural proposals for corporate governance as a specification of the 
normative theory of consensual, society-wide good governance developed in Buchanan’s and 
Tullock’s (1962) Calculus of Consent. Turning to stakeholder participation we axiomatically 
characterize a procedure expressive of Kantian equal respect for persons in a corporate 
governance context and illustrate its properties. Conceding the objection that “implementing 
stakeholder participation as egalitarian bidding” is not incentive compatible (not 
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underbidding proof) we draw attention to the role of intrinsic motivation.  After discussing 
some further objections against our procedural proposal we conclude with a warning against 
relying too strongly on ideal theories of economics and ethics when it comes to practical 
business ethics and its relation to corporate governance.  
 
2. Freeman’s and Friedman’s Appeals to “Kantianism”  
In opposition to prevailing shareholder value conceptions of good corporate governance 
Edward Freeman’s declared aim is to “revitalize the concept of managerial capitalism:” 
 
“My thesis is that we can revitalize the concept of managerial capitalism by replacing the 
notion that managers have a duty to stockholders with the concept that managers bear a 
fiduciary relationship to stakeholders. Stakeholders are those groups who have a stake in or 
claim on the firm. Specifically I include suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, and 
the local community, as well as management in its role as agent for these groups. I argue that 
the legal, economic, political, and moral challenges to the currently received theory of the 
firm, as a nexus of contracts among the owners of the factors of production and customers, 
require us to revise this concept. That is, each of these stakeholder groups has a right not to be 
treated as a means to some end, and therefore must participate in determining the future 
direction of the firm in which they have a stake.” (Freeman 1984, 184) 
 
 As upshot of this citation the last sentence emphasizes two crucial points: first, each 
stakeholder group has a “right not to be treated as mere means to some end” and, second, 
“therefore must participate in determining the future direction of the firm in which they have 
a stake.” 
 The first point is a direct translation of the terms in which Kant himself presents his 
central ethical ideal of interpersonal respect. The second point that  “each of these 
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stakeholder groups” … “must participate in determining the future direction of the firm” 
indicates that for Freeman participation of all stakeholder groups is necessary to implement 
the “right not to be treated as mere means to some end.”1  
Shareholder value theorists will be tempted to dismiss Freeman’s views as alien to the 
liberal type of market economics to which they typically subscribe. They should recall, 
though, that Kantian ideals have been and presumably are still shared by many of their fellow 
shareholder value theorists.2 As a gentle reminder  it suffices to cite Milton Friedman’s 
endorsement of values of Kantian inter-personal respect:3 
 
“Desirable or not, any end that can be attained only by the use of bad means must give way to 
the more basic end of the use of acceptable means. To the liberal, the appropriate means are 
free discussion and voluntary co-operation, which implies that any form of coercion is 
                                                 
1 “Must therefore” is meaningful only if what “must” be done in fact “can” be done. 
2 It may be a contingent historical accident that the Darden School at which Freeman is located is part of the 
University of Virginia, Charlottesville. But it seems significant that in this environment some of the clearest 
statements of Kantian interpersonal respect norms in economics have traditionally been made. To give two 
examples from USA, in his 1956 UNESCO report “on the state of economics in the United States of America” 
Rutledge Vining says: “To require of each individual that he takes no action which impairs the freedom 
of any other individual is to accept the moral principle that no individual should treat another simply 
as a means to an end” (Vining 1956, 19), James M. Buchanan, who along with Ronald Coase had joined the 
faculty from the mid 1950’s has always worked in the equal mutual respect framework to which he himself 
refers as ‘politics as exchange.’ The voluntariness of exchange represents inter-personal respect and the 
inclusiveness of all affected is represented by the assumption that “‘political exchange’ necessarily 
involves all members of the relevant community rather than the two trading partners that characterize economic 
exchange” (Buchanan 1975, 50, emphasis original).  
3 At least in common perception Milton Friedman is the almost arche-typical “hard-nosed economist” and 
“witness of the crown” of a shareholder value approach in business ethics. 
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inappropriate. The ideal is unanimity among responsible individuals achieved on the basis of 
free and full discussion.” (Friedman 2002, 22-23) 
 
 Friedman’s statement is meant to apply on the constitutional political level of the 
“legal rules of market-interaction.”4 Once the rules of the market are fixed then within 
market-rules, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits” (Friedman 
1970). According to the implicitly utilitarian (welfare economic) conception of Friedman 
business is obliged to allocate resources to their most valuable uses – i.e., the purposes most 
conducive  (as indicated by price signals) to furthering general welfare.5  
Contrary to Friedman, Freeman does not accept that the stakeholders’ “right not to be 
treated as mere means to some end” can be discharged by choosing on the polity-wide 
constitutional level rules of the ‘private law society.’6 Freeman rejects the view that, once the 
rules of law have conferred well-defined (equal) legal rights and powers on all individuals, 
interpersonal respect will be sufficiently secured by the voluntariness of contractual 
agreement among individuals.7 
                                                 
4 The strategy of restricting unanimity to the constitutional level while assuming less than unanimous agreement 
on subconstitutional levels is developed in more detail in the Calculus of Consent of Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962, vol. 3) which we shall apply to corporate governance subsequently. 
5 Friedman assumes that the market signals tell – under appropriate conditions – fairly accurately what the value 
increasing allocations are. 
6 Böhm (1966), an influential German constitutional lawyer, uses this expression to characterize markets as a 
subsystem of the economic order of a free western society. Like other members of the so-called ordo liberal 
Freiburg School he strongly sympathized with the values of the Mont Pelerin society among whose “noble” 
members were besides its founder F.A. v. Hayek, scholars like G. Becker, J. M. Buchanan, M. Friedman, V. 
Smith.  
7 Private property as such confers the legal power to make decisions without any obligation to pursue the 
common weal. Within the powers so conferred the entrepreneur who owns a firm may legally do as seems fit 
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The second of Freeman’s two central points indicates that letting groups of 
stakeholders participate in (co-)determining the future direction of the firm can prevent using 
them as mere instruments in pursuit of shareholder value. Though prima facie plausible, as a 
protection against using stakeholders as “mere means,” relying on group participation in 
corporate decision making as an approximate expression of inter-individual respect needs to 
be qualified:8 first, for individual group members who are able to personally exit from the 
corporate nexus at relatively low costs, “non-exit” is functionally equivalent and has the same 
“justificatory power” as expressing (tacit) assent by personal omission of a veto (on a higher 
level than implemented by group representation and group veto within the company). Second, 
complementary to omitting or taking the exit option the possibility of active participation 
(voice) yields a “graded” guarantee of Kantian respect to the extent that it amounts to “some” 
(group) veto power in matters that involve high exit costs for individual actors.9   
                                                 
with her or his property. In particular, there is no legal obligation to follow market signals and to increase value. 
In this regard Milton Friedman, perhaps surprisingly, seems to endorse an ethical social responsibility 
conception as well since he seems to assume that there is an ethical obligation to use property in value 
increasing ways rather than being legally and ethically “free to choose.” 
8 Though it seems plausible that the basic right of an individual to be treated as an end is respected if the 
individual herself participates in a decision that she could individually veto this seems quite precarious in cases 
in which the individual is merely a member of a group with veto power. To illustrate, consider the case of an 
individual taxicab driver who is instrumental to bringing her passenger to his destination. She is not used as a 
means only if she can reject the prospective passenger’s contract offer (i.e. veto it). In case of a group of taxicab 
drivers who assign fares to individual drivers collectively, say by majority voting, it seems much more doubtful 
that participation in the voting process is sufficient to guarantee that the individual is not used as a mere means 
to ends that she does not own.  
9 Of course, in a fuller account costs of entry – including developing firm specific human capital as sunk costs – 
would have to be discussed, too. But for our present purposes it suffices to focus on exit as a protection. 
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In sum, Freeman substitutes the Kantian focus on individuals by a group related 
requirement. Subsequently we accept this deviation from Kantian individualism as a 
concession to practicability. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to a discussion of employee 
participation (leaving out, eg., customer participation). Our aim is, to transparently 
characterize a procedure of employee participation by an axiomatic representation of 
“values” that, as we shall indicate, jointly prevent instrumentalization of stakeholder groups. 
Our claim is, that implementing this procedure could amount to incorporating the “right not 
to be treated as mere means to some end” in corporate governance. 
 
3. The Calculus of Consent Goes Business 
3.1 Contractarianism and Economics 
Of the three so-called “new contractarians” (Gordon, 1976), Buchanan, Nozick and Rawls, 
the first is conventionally associated with Hobbes, the second with Locke and the third with 
Kant. In case of Nozick and Rawls this grouping of new and old contractarians seems 
basically correct. As far as Buchanan is concerned some additional comments and 
qualifications are, however, necessary. Though he certainly invited a broadly Hobbesian 
interpretation of his basic views in some of his work, the ethical ideals of inter-personal 
respect underlying his conception of “politics as exchange” are clearly Kantian in spirit 
(Kliemt 2011, Brennan and Kliemt 2019). We restrict ourselves to Buchanan’s and Tullock’s 
seminal Calculus of Consent and see Buchanan – as he did himself – as endorsing the same 
ethical outlook as Rawls who is a self-declared adherent of Kantian ideals (in particular in his 
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criticism of utilitarianism and welfarism as insufficiently respectful of “the separateness of 
persons”).10  
Like Milton Friedman, Buchanan and Tullock’s Calculus invokes “unanimity” yet of 
an explicitly collective decision procedure. Buchanan, taking his inspiration from Knut 
Wicksell (1896), thinks that unanimity has to and can be brought about by side-payments. 
Collective projects are to be financed by positive or negative transfers that can induce each 
and every individual not to veto them.11  
 In slightly different terms: empowered to veto, the individual who omits using the 
veto, voluntarily ratifies the decision of the collective. The procedural presence of individual 
veto power guarantees – exactly as Freeman suggests for groups – that the veto-omitting (in 
this sense “ratifying”) individual is not used as a mere means.12  
                                                 
10 Like Rawls, and for that matter, John Harsanyi, Buchanan uses the figure of the decision-maker who, ignorant 
of how he would be personally affected by decisions, would in some way or other represent the common 
interest. This idea was articulated in full first by Vickrey (1945) in response to the then “new” preference-
representational utility concept. The idea somehow must have transpired to others who all in the following years 
articulated their versions of a “veil of uncertainty,” “ignorance” or “ethical/impartial preferences” etc. But for 
our purposes these veils, though making voluntary agreement more plausible, are less important than the basic 
principle that agreement of each and every individual is – under certain conditions – taken to be necessary and 
sufficient for securing inter-personal respect: no individual who had a veto against a decision can afterwards 
complain that it was imposed on her or him, “volenti non fit iniuria.” Of course, that one cannot by voluntary 
agreement inflict an injustice on oneself can be criticized as well but the discussion of issues concerning 
obligations to oneself would lead too far here.  
11 Other than Kaldor-Hicks conceivable compensation, compensations have to be actually paid at least on the 
group level.  
12 The example of the taxicab driver invoked in footnote 8 can be adapted easily to show the analogy in case of 
voting under the unanimity requirement or collective decision-making in the shadow of individual veto power. 
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3.2 Collective Action and Unanimity in Constitutional Economics 
If all have in fact unanimously agreed – in all likelihood induced by side payments and 
certain procedural guarantees of institutional “rights” –, the argument yields a convincing 
justification of the claim that due to prior assent nobody is used as a mere means.13 However, 
the unanimity requirement may seem outrageously unrealistic in practical contexts. In view 
of this, an adherent of the ideal never to use other individuals as mere means must endeavor 
to find ways of approximating the ideal of unanimity where- and whenever possible. This is 
the line of argument that we shall explore via adapting the basic argument of the Calculus of 
Consent to corporate governance rules for stakeholder groups. 
 Note first, that in corporate as opposed to political governance free entry and exit can 
plausibly substitute veto power as bestowed on individuals by the unanimity rule.14 To the 
extent that it has been specified in advance what contractors agree to and to the extent that 
alternatives existed those who contract with a firm have “veto power” and can plausibly be 
held responsible for joining the contract nexus of the firm.15  
 Adherents of free market organization often seem to think that the preceding line of 
argument is sufficient to secure that stakeholders of companies operating on such markets are 
not used as mere means. In particular the exit option secures against the more severe forms of 
abuse. However, like contract enforcement exit and entry may be very costly. Moreover, one 
                                                 
13 At least if certain conditions of “informed (cool-state) consent” are met. 
14 The emigration argument of Plato’s Crito -though often interpreted as justifying the moral obligation to 
submit to collective decisions because of choosing not to emigrate – is a forceful reduction to the absurd of the 
exit-argument in case of membership in political communities. Hume (1985, Essay XII)  presents the classical 
criticisms against contractarianism in politics. Yet contractarianism remains alive and is certainly more plausible 
in case of firms or clubs than in case of political communities. 
15 To the extent that contractors know what they “buy into” the time honored maxims of “caveat emptor” and 
“volenti non fit iniuria” apply with full force. 
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central reason for having firms derives from the impossibility to fully specify contracts in 
view of an uncertain future. Where the use of contractually conferred powers remains 
substantively underspecified individuals may still be “abused as means” by those in 
command of discretionary powers. Therefore, for contingencies that cannot be sufficiently 
foreseen additional procedural safeguards complementary to those provided by “exit and 
entry” from the contract nexus with the firm may be required by the contractors.16  
Safeguards of inter-personal respect in decision-making have typically be seen as 
embodied in the participatory nature of decision-making procedures. To the extent that 
procedural specifications are credible and transparent commitments of corporate governance, 
stakeholders can evaluate the participatory mechanisms on offer. Knowing the corporate 
governance structure of the company (due to procedural specification) before entering into a 
relationship with it the firm’s stakeholders (including shareholders) can “ratify” its 
governance procedures (or not).17 This way, inter-firm competition for stakeholder patronage 
can be extended to alternative bylaws of (participatory) corporate governance. This part of 
corporate governance can thereby become subject to market valuations and the control 
exerted by them (including the additional level of group participation as an approximation of 
individual “powers”). 
                                                 
16 Freeman rightly emphasizes the role of “entry and exit” yet, underemphasizes that the presence of these 
options reduces the role of group participation in governance to a complementary or subsidiary role in 
expressing Kantian values of inter-individual respect. 
17 Stakeholder conceptions that go to the extreme of including non-contractual relationships with the 
environment or future generations are neglected here. The values that they support may be plausible but not as 
values of a stakeholder conception. 
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4. Procedural Stakeholder Participation 
To “translate” the “Kantian” ideals expressed by stakeholder conceptions into concrete 
institutional governance rules the corporate governance structure should procedurally support 
the search for universal advantage and agreement under constraints of inter-individual 
respect. To this effect, basically Buchanan’s ideal of “politics as (multilateral) exchange” 
must be extended from political governance to non-poltical corporate actors.18  
The mechanism we outline next incorporates both a common denominator (facilitating 
compromise and tradeoffs) and group-based veto power (making compromise and 
concessions a necessity). In this as in other forms of bargaining the measuring rod of money 
will do better as common denominator than any conceivable alternative. At least this is what 
we assume in our outline of a procedure of stakeholder participation as egalitarian bidding.  
 
4.1 An Outline of a Procedure of Stakeholder Participation 
Assume that the management considers plans of how to (re)structure the firm. Let 𝑀 denote 
the set of mutually exclusive19 plans and refer to 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 as a typical element of that set. 
Assume that for each plan m management states a “surplus claim” 𝑆𝑚.
20 
Being informed about 𝑀 and 𝑆 = {𝑆𝑚: 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀} by management which has the 
prerogative of an agenda setter, the stakeholders 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 (𝑛 ≥ 1) can participate via 
bidding, i.e. via stating bids 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) ∈ ℝ for all 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 according to the following rules: 
 
Veto condition: If 𝑏1(𝑚) + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛(𝑚) < 𝑆𝑚, for some 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 then plan m is rejected.  
                                                 
18 See Buchanan (1999, vol. 1), passim and for further discussion Brennan and Kliemt (2018).  
19 This is obviously no restriction since one can consider bundles of such plans as mutually exclusive. 
20 When the surplus, generated by 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, is stochastic, the surplus claims of management may condition on 
random events. 
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 Since stakeholder groups 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 – respectively their representatives –  are all 
“free to choose” their monetary bids 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) ∈ ℝ (including negative values) they can 
obviously veto it by some appropriately low bid so that for any 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 the veto condition is 
fulfilled. By their veto they incur the opportunity cost that m is not realized. Otherwise 
voicing an “appropriately low” figure as a bid is a purely expressive act that imposes no 
higher transaction costs on them than voicing a higher bid. 
If 𝑏1(𝑚) + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛(𝑚) ≥ 𝑆𝑚 plan 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 is not vetoed. A necessary condition for 
implementing 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 is met and management is authorized by the rules to consider it an 
eligible option.  
It may be worth noting that management can subsidize (𝑆𝑚 < 0) certain plans from 
other resources of the company to win stakeholders over. Yet, there is no guarantee that any 
plan will meet the necessary condition for implementing it; that is, after stakeholders have 
been bidding on all 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 the subset 
𝑀𝑎 = {𝑚 ∈ 𝑀: 𝑏1(𝑚) + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛(𝑚) ≥ 𝑆𝑚} 
of acceptable plans 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 may be empty.  
 
Status quo condition: If 𝑀𝑎 = ∅ or if, in case of 𝑀𝑎 ≠ ∅, none of the plans in 𝑀𝑎 is realized 
by management the status quo is maintained. 
 
Stating all payoffs in relation to the status quo, we can assume that management and 
stakeholders 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 all receive 0-payoffs if either 𝑀𝑎 =  ∅ or management abstains from 
realizing any of the acceptable plans 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑎  despite  𝑀𝑎 ≠ ∅. 
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Equal split condition: If 𝑀𝑎 ≠ ∅ and plan 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑎 is realized by management then 
management receives 𝑆𝑚 and stakeholders 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛  earn 
𝑉𝑖(𝑚) − 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) +
𝑏1(𝑚) + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛(𝑚) − 𝑆𝑚
𝑛
 
𝑉𝑖(𝑚) is the true value of stakeholder i when 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑎 is realized. Of course, 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) usually is 
i’s private information while all the other factors determining stakeholder i’s information are 
commonly known from overt bidding.  
Since the mechanism grants veto power at zero opportunity cost (except for the 
constraint that bidders must jointly meet the requirement of 𝑀𝑎 ≠ ∅ if any positively valued 
change is to occur), whatever their 𝑉𝑖(𝑚), the stakeholders usually have an incentive to 
underbid.21 Still, despite the underbidding incentive, egalitarian bidding of the kind we 
suggest is at least one  feasible way of translating into procedural terms the ideal of Kantian 
equal respect for stakeholders along with an adequately priviledged role of management as 
agenda setter. Moreover, as we endeavor to indicate next, the procedure seems normatively 
and empirically more reasonable than economic folk wisdom on mechanism design may 
initially suggest. 
 
4.2 Properties of Participation as Egalitarian Bidding 
(V) The mechanism guarantees “voluntariness.”  
It fulfills 
𝑉𝑖(𝑚) − 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) +
𝑏1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑛(𝑚)−𝑆𝑚
𝑛
≥ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) ≤ 𝑉𝑖(𝑚)  for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 
                                                 
21 Only in case of commonly known 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) + ⋯ + 𝑉𝑛(𝑚) = 𝑆𝑚 underbidding incentives would not exist.  
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i.e. stakeholder groups 𝑖 =  1, … , 𝑛 can only lose, relative to the status quo, when 
overbidding; furthermore, by bidding low enough, possibly via 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) < 0 or 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) <
 𝑉𝑖(𝑚), each stakeholder group i can veto any plan 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀.
22 
As has already been mentioned, the values 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) for all 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 can, and as a rule, 
will be private information of stakeholder 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. This obviously renders procedural 
guarantees of equal treatment with respect to private values impossible. However, this does 
not rule out guarantees of equal treatment with respect to monetary bids 𝑏𝑖(𝑚). The latter and 
the equal treatment with respect to them are overt acts that are observable.  
 
(E) The mechanism guarantees “equal respect according to (overt) bids.” 
Substituting 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) by 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) in the payoff specification for stakeholders yields equal 
respect according to (overt) bids 
  𝑏𝑖(𝑚) − 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) +
𝑏1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑛(𝑚)−𝑆𝑚
𝑛
=
𝑏1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑛(𝑚)−𝑆𝑚
𝑛
  for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛  
With respect to their interpersonally observable bids, all stakeholder groups 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 are 
treated equally by receiving an equal share of 𝑏1(𝑚) + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑛(𝑚) − 𝑆𝑚. That is, the 
procedure not only grants equal veto power but also equal treatment as far as overt payoff 
consequences relative to the status quo are concerned.  
 
(O) The co-determination mechanism is overbidding proof. 
                                                 
22 The so-called “hold out problem,” that this gives rise to, probably motivates many scholars to reject the 
unanimity requirement. It should not be neglected, though, that some stakeholders i with 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) < 0 for some 
𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 may get compensated when moderately underbidding in terms of 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) < 𝑉𝑖(𝑚). In that case, 𝑚 may 
still be acceptable and possibly implemented by management. In any event, the interest of guaranteeing that  
𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑎 applies will recommend to exercise some moderation in strategic underbidding. 
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 It does not pay for any stakeholder 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 to overbid the value 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) since, 
relative to truthful bidding 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑚), overbidding would yield a disadvantage for 
stakeholder group i due to  
𝑉𝑖(𝑚) − 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) +
𝑏1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑛(𝑚)−𝑆𝑚
𝑛
<
𝑏1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑛(𝑚)−𝑆𝑚
𝑛
  for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛. 
This reduction of payoff would apply if management implemented a plan 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 for which 
even the truthful bid 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) would not guarantee acceptability, so that 𝑏1(𝑚) + ⋯ +
𝑏𝑛(𝑚) ≥ 𝑆𝑚 for plan 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 results exclusively from i’s overbidding. If for 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) 
plan 𝑚 is unacceptable, i.e. 𝑏1(𝑚) + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑖−1(𝑚) + 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) + 𝑏𝑖+1(𝑚) + ⋯ 𝑏𝑛(𝑚) < 𝑆𝑚, 
stakeholder i would suffer a loss when overbidding -- 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) > 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) -- due to  
𝑉𝑖(𝑚) − 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) +
𝑏1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑖−1(𝑚)+𝑉𝑖(𝑚)+𝑏𝑖+1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑛(𝑚)−𝑆𝑚
𝑛
+
𝑏𝑖(𝑚)−𝑉𝑖(𝑚)
𝑛
=
𝑛−1
𝑛
[𝑉𝑖(𝑚) −
𝑏𝑖(𝑚)] +
𝑏1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑖−1(𝑚)+𝑉𝑖(𝑚)+𝑏𝑖+1(𝑚)+⋯+𝑏𝑛(𝑚)−𝑆𝑚
𝑛
< 0  
by assumption.  
 The co-determination mechanism of “stakeholder participation as egalitarian bidding” 
shares the properties (V), (E) and (O) with familiar institutions like, in particular, first-price 
auctions.23 Belonging to a class of familiar institutions is certainly desirable with respect to 
practical uses of a procedure. Yet, familiarity is not sufficient to vindicate a mechanism like 
the proposed one against objections. 
 
5. Critical Assessment of Underbidding Incentives 
As indicated, if ideals of Kantian equal respect are procedurally expressed in terms of 
“stakeholder participation as egalitarian bidding” the resulting mechanism is not 
                                                 
23 It can be shown that some such mechanisms can be fully characterized by requiring that they be “envy-free” 
and meeting requirement (E) with respect to (overt) bids; see Güth (2011). 
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underbidding proof. It invites bid-shading, i.e. 𝑏𝑖(𝑚) < 𝑉𝑖(𝑚) for 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 and i = 1,…,n. Yet 
whether this forms a decisive argument against the mechanism depends.  
 First, there is no procedure fulfilling properties (V), (E) and (O) that is over- and 
underbidding-proof and generally implementable.24 A trade-off between fulfilling desirable 
properties cannot be avoided in procedural implementations of the ideals of stakeholder 
theories.  
Second, we cannot imagine a mechanism that confers discretionary power on 
collective bodies and at the same time grants procedural veto power to each and every 
member of the decision-making body unless property (V) – or some variant of it – is fulfilled 
at least for groups. Adherents of stakeholder conceptions who reject “stakeholder 
participation as egalitarian bidding” but accept that they need to go beyond mere appeals to 
Kantian ideals should – and presumably would have a hard time to – come up with 
constructive procedural counter proposals.   
 Third, requiring (E) along with (V) translates ideals of substantive equality into 
procedural specifications. To the extent that the effects of (E) and (V) are perceived as such 
by participating stakeholders this may psychologically (causally) reduce their proclivity to 
underbid by strengthening the intrinsic motivation to bid truthfully or even to overbid due to 
some crowding in of, say, corporate identity or corporate social responsibility concerns.    
 
6. Critical Assessment of a Potential Role of Intrinsic Motivation 
As stated in our subtitle the practical proof of Kantian appeals expressing the values of 
stakeholder participation is in the institutional eating. This is why we took much care to 
                                                 
24 Using, for instance, the Revelation Principle would require the highly restrictive common knowledge 
assumption of game theoretic equilibrium analysis. 
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specify rules that conceivably allow to test the implications of approximating Kantian 
normative ideals of stakeholder theories in practice. We are ourselves not naively assuming 
that the implementation of our (or any alternative) procedural translation of the ideals of 
stakeholder theories will lead to attractive results independent of context. Yet, there is quite 
some empirical and in particular experimental evidence showing that under favorable 
circumstances intrinsic motivation may exert much stronger influences on practical 
stakeholder behavior than typical conceptions of mechanism design and principal agent 
theory assume in their search for “knave proof” institutions.25 
Experimental research on bidding mechanisms has provided ample evidence that 
rather subtle aspects of implementation may matter. Moreover, some first findings of 
bounded under- and even some overbidding in an explorative experiment on “egalitarian 
bidding” suggest seeking ways of strengthening such effects.26 In particular, explicit framing, 
to enhance awareness of properties (V), (E) and (O) may be expected to strengthen intrinsic 
                                                 
25 This point has been rightly emphasized by adherents of stakeholder conceptions from the start. It can be 
supported by many findings of psychology and experimental economics. Starting from Hume’s well-known 
remark “that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the 
constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private 
interest.” (Hume 1985, 42, Essay IV). Bowles (2016) provides an excellent overview over relevant experimental 
results concerning the validity of the behavioral assumptions underlying mechanism design. 
26 In an explorative experimental study by Alberti, Güth, and Tsutsui (2020), that implemented “stakeholder 
participation as egalitarian bidding”, bounded bid shading and even some systematic overbidding could in fact 
be observed. It seems that some stakeholders did not want to block a plan that might be “good for the firm” even 
though affecting themselves negatively. Obviously more research concerning effects of fairness perceptions and 
intrinsic motivation based on procedurally fair bidding is necessary before stronger claims can be based on 
evidence.  
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motivation of stakeholders to act “fairly” in what they regard as the common interest of all 
stakeholders. 
 Of course, ultimately any co-determination mechanism for corporate governance must 
live up to the test of competitive market evaluation:  In countries in which the market for 
corporate control is working reasonably well instances of testing “the Kantian pudding in the 
institutional eating” would in fact arise after some companies implemented values of 
stakeholder theory in terms of procedurally fair bidding for at least some types of decisions.  
As long as stakeholder theorists do not go beyond mere appeals to Kantian ideals the 
lack of operational realism prevents subjecting their theories to the test of competiive 
markets. If they cannot or do not want to discharge the burden of procedural proof of their 
“appealing values” this speaks against stakeholder conceptions in general. Sympathizing with 
their values our tentative proposal is meant to nudge stakeholder theorists towards a new kind  
of “mechanism desing” that leaves some room for precisely the intrinsic motives that they 
invoke in their ideal theories.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The so-called “contractarianism”  to which countless modern philosophers, philosopher 
economists and business ethicists subscribe remains in the realm of ideal theory unless 
translated into procedures. It is one of the great merits of Buchanan’s and Tullock’s approach 
in the Calculus of Consent that it translates contractarian ideals into ideal procedural theory. 
Yet even this is merely a first step towards implementation since advocating an ideal 
procedure conferring veto power on each and everybody in ideal theory must consider how 
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ideal procedures for an ideal world can in fact be approximated by specific implementations 
in the real world.27  
 Following up on this, stakeholder theories should make an extended effort to 
demonstrate, first, that the values they propagate can be spelled out by operational rules, 
second, how the rules can be implemented institutionally in corporate governance and, third, 
that corporations that implemented corresponding mechanisms as part of their corporate 
governance structures can survive and thrive in inter-firm competition.28  
If these three conditions could in fact be metthis would have interesting implications 
for the somewhat overblown controversy between stakeholder and shareholder conceptions in 
business ethics. For, then, letting stakeholders participate in corporate governance could 
become instrumental to creating “sufficient” shareholder value in competition with other 
value creating firms.29 Adherents of shareholder value conceptions could reasonably suggest 
that shareholders endorse corporate governance rules whose implementation can induce the 
corporation to behave “as if” led by Kantian ethical ideals. This would meet the shareholder 
theorists ultimate test of practical business ethics for competitive market societies in that  
such companies would be “doing well by doing good.”  At the same time the search for 
procedures that implement the ideals of stakeholder theories would revitalize  managerial 
capitalism as Freeman intends. 
 
  
                                                 
27 On ideal theory see Brennan and Pettit (2005), and Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012); for an extended recent 
account of the philosophical debate see Gaus (2016), while Geuss (2008) is a straightforward traditional defense 
of feasibility requirements in theories of political governance. 
28 In the spirit of Alchian (1950). 
29 Value measured as for instance in the McKinsey’s “valuation bible” (Koller, Goedhart, and Wessels 2015). 
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